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PUBLIC UTILITIES, EMINENT DOMAIN,
AND LOCAL LAND USE REGULATIONS:
HAS TEXAS FOUND THE PROPER BALANCE?
Michael B. Kent, Jr. t
INTRODUCTION
For more than half a century, the state courts have disagreed about
whether public utility companies possessing the power of eminent do-
main must comply with local land use regulations.1 In 1978, an anno-
tation appearing in the American Law Reports identified "some
controversy over the question,"2 and recent decisions from Georgia
and Missouri suggest that, three decades after that annotation was
written, the controversy remains active.' Indeed, gas drilling opera-
tions in Texas's Barnett Shale, to provide only one example, vividly
demonstrate that the issue has continuing significance.4 These opera-
tions have set the stage for potential battles between several Texas
cities and public utility companies over the placement and construc-
tion of natural gas facilities within municipal limits.5 The stakes in
t Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law (2009-
2010); Assistant Professor, Atlanta's John Marshall Law School; J.D., magna cum
laude, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., cum laude, University of Alabama.
1. Compare, e.g., Forsyth County v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 632 S.E.2d 101, 104
(Ga. 2006), and Graham Farms, Inc. v. Ind. Power & Light Co., 233 N.E.2d 656, 666
(Ind. 1968), and Chester County v. Phila. Elec. Co., 218 A.2d 331, 332-33 (Pa. 1966),
with N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Statler, 122 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1953), and State ex rel. Kearns v. Ohio Power Co., 127 N.E.2d 394, 399 (Ohio 1955),
and Potomac Edison Co. v. Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 512 S.E.2d
576, 582 (W. Va. 1998).
2. Allan Manley, Annotation, Applicability of Zoning Regulations to Projects of
Nongovernmental Public Utility as Affected by Utility's Having Power of Eminent Do-
main, 87 A.L.R.3d 1265 (1978).
3. Compare Forsyth, 632 S.E.2d at 104 (exempting public utility from county zon-
ing ordinance on grounds that ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon public util-
ity's eminent domain power), with StopAquila.org v. Aquila, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 24, 41
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting public utility's argument that its eminent domain
power was superior to local zoning regulations).
4. See Timothy Riley, Note, Wrangling With Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas
Municipal Oil and Gas Development Ordinances Against Regulatory Takings Chal-
lenges, 32 VT. L. REV. 349, 351-52 (2007), for a brief account of gas production in the
Barnett Shale, including a natural history of the shale itself.
5. See Jim Magill, Gas Pipeline Sues Texas City Over Development Rule, GAS
DAILY, Oct. 3, 2008, at 3 (commenting on "clash of competing corporate and munici-
pal interests as gas producers expanding their operations in the gas-rich Barnett Shale
of North Texas increasingly move into more densely populated communities on the
outskirts of Fort Worth"), available at 2008 WLNR 19791300; Jeff Mosier, Gas Com-
pany Taking Town to Court Over Drilling Denials, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jul. 3,
2008, at 12B (reporting on lawsuit filed by natural gas company due to rejection by
local government of 15 variance requests), available at 2008 WLNR 12494081; Jon
Nielson, Gas Company Lawsuit Challenges GP's Rules, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 3, 2008, at 7B ("[S]everal [North Texas] cities are debating how to handle the
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such disputes are high inasmuch as the ability of public utilities to pro-
vide adequate service, the ability of local governments to protect their
residents and communities, and the possibility for substantial profits
often hang in the balance.6
In addressing the proper relationship between a utility's eminent
domain power and a city's zoning authority,7 the Texas appellate
courts have provided seemingly mixed answers. Two decisions from
the 1940s and 1950s can be read as suggesting that a utility's power of
eminent domain trumps a city's zoning authority,8 whereas a decision
from the 1970s held that a utility's condemnation power is not supe-
rior to local zoning regulations. 9 The Texas Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue, although it has limited the force of local land use
regulations in the somewhat analogous context of a governmental en-
tity exercising its own condemnation power.1 ° Not without reason,
conventional wisdom has viewed Texas law on this matter as "some-
what unclear."11 A recent federal decision arising from the aforemen-
tioned gas drilling, however, puts these authorities in perspective and
suggests that there may be a middle ground. 12
Using Texas as a case study, this article reviews the relevant Texas
law on the subject and (expanding on the reasoning employed by the
recent federal decision) argues that Texas law in fact provides a con-
structive balance between a utility's interests and those of the local
influx of natural gas drilling in more urban areas that sit atop the Barnett Shale"),
available at 2008 WLNR 18838683; see also Riley, supra note 4, at 349-50 ("[M]any
cities have enacted their own regulatory ordinances, which often impose more strin-
gent permitting and site location requirements, or entirely prohibit drilling in certain
locations").
6. During the four-year period between 2001 and 2005, gas companies invested
more than $3.4 billion in drilling operations in the Barnett Shale and recovered more
than $5.3 billion from gross cumulative gas sales. Riley, supra note 4, at 352.
7. Although the term "zoning" is most properly identified with regulations that
dictate how particular parcels of land may be used within prescribed territorial
boundaries, it is used here to encompass the more wide-ranging power of local gov-
ernments to regulate the use and development of land generally. See, e.g., Michael B.
Kent, Jr., Forming a Tie That Binds: Development Agreements in Georgia and the
Need for Legislative Clarity, 30 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 4 & n.10 (2006)
(offering definitions of "zoning").
8. See Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. White, 281 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
9. See Porter v. Sw. Pub. Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. See City of Lubbock v. Austin, 628 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tex. 1982) (discussing city
exercising power of eminent domain not bound by own zoning ordinance absent
showing that condemnation is unreasonable or arbitrary); Austin Ind. Sch. Dist. v.
City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973) (holding city may not exercise zon-
ing so as to exclude facilities of public school district possessing power of eminent
domain).
11. Manley, supra note 2, at 1272.
12. See Tex. Midstream Gas Servs., L.L.C. v. City of Grand Prairie, No. 3:08-CV-
1724-D, 2008 WL 5000038 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2008).
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government. Moreover, the balanced approach established by the
Texas cases provides a model for other jurisdictions due to the incen-
tives it provides for bargaining between the utility company, the local
government, and community leaders.
I. TEXAS CASE LAW - MICROCOSM OF A NATIONAL DEBATE
As suggested above, there is a split in authority nationwide regard-
ing whether public utilities possessing the power of eminent domain
must comply with local land use regulations.' 3 Because Texas appel-
late courts have issued decisions cited by both sides of the debate,
Texas law provides a useful case study to explore the arguments and
proposed solutions to the problem. To that end, the following discus-
sion reviews the relevant Texas decisions as a means of framing the
pertinent issues.
A. Must Public Utilities Comply With Local Zoning?
1. Fort Worth & Denver City Railway Company v. Ammons
The first Texas decision to consider the interplay between a utility's
eminent domain power and the zoning authority of a local govern-
ment was Fort Worth & Denver City Railway Company v. Ammons,
issued in 1948.14 That case arose from a dispute between the City of
Lubbock and a railroad company over the proposed extension of an
industrial spur line into an area of the city zoned for residential use.15
The city obtained an injunction prohibiting construction of the spur
line within the residential zone,16 and the railroad appealed on the
ground that its power of eminent domain, being superior to the city's
zoning authority, effectively exempted the railroad from compliance
with the zoning ordinance.17
In resolving the dispute, the court began its discussion with a com-
parison of the two powers in conflict. The powers of eminent domain
and zoning have much in common, explained the court, inasmuch as
both are exercised to prevent an individual landowner from using his
13. Compare, e.g., Forsyth County v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 632 S.E.2d 101, 104
(Ga. 2006), and Graham Farms, Inc. v. Ind. Power & Light Co., 233 N.E.2d 656, 666
(Ind. 1968), and Chester County v. Phila. Elec. Co., 218 A.2d 331, 332-33 (Pa. 1966),
with N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Statler, 122 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1953), and State ex rel. Kearns v. Ohio Power Co., 127 N.E.2d 394, 399 (Ohio 1955),
and Potomac Edison Co. v. Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 512 S.E.2d
576, 582 (W. Va. 1998).
14. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1948, writ ref d n.r.e.).
15. Id. at 408-09.
16. The lawsuit initially was filed by several residents of the affected zone, but the
city subsequently intervened and adopted their pleadings. Id. For the sake of conve-
nience, the following discussion uses the term "city" to refer to all of the plaintiffs
collectively, as well as to the City of Lubbock itself.
17. See id. at 409.
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property in ways that harm the general welfare. Eminent domain pre-
vents the landowner from "obstruct[ing] the public necessity by refus-
ing to part with his property," while zoning prevents him "from using
his property in a manner contrary to the general comfort and protec-
tion of the public."18 Nonetheless, the court continued, there exist
significant differences in the two powers. First, a city's zoning author-
ity arises from a delegation of the state's police power to protect the
public health, safety, comfort, and welfare. 9 A utility's power of emi-
nent domain, however, is a delegation of the state's right to appropri-
ate private property for public use, and is "one of the inalienable
rights of sovereignty."20 Concomitant with this right is the sovereign
discretion to select which land will be put to public use, and this dis-
cretion also is delegated to the utility company along with the con-
demnation power itself.2 Second, the court noted that the exercise of
eminent domain requires that the affected landowner receive just
compensation for the taking, whereas no compensation accompanies
the usual exercise of the police power. "The absence of compensa-
tion," explained the court, "makes the police power much harsher in
operation than the power of eminent domain and, hence, subject to
stricter limitations."22
With these distinctions in mind, the court then addressed the partic-
ular dispute before it. Again noting that the railroad received its con-
demnation authority from the state itself, the court explained that the
state had "a sovereign interest in railroads" as a means of transporta-
tion and commerce, "the same as it does in highways or streets. '23
Absent any abuse in the powers delegated to it,24 the railroad was
essentially acting as an agent of the state with respect to this interest.
As a result, the court held that those portions of the city's zoning ordi-
nance that conflicted with the railroad's location of the line must give
way. In short, the city could not prevent the railroad from placing its
line where the railroad deemed necessary, even if that meant the line
would not be in conformity with the local zoning plan. 5 Significantly,
however, the court held that, although the railroad would not have to
comply with the city's zoning designation of the land in question, it
would have to comply with the city's requirement to obtain a con-
struction permit prior to building the new line.26
18. Id. at 410.
19. Id. at 409.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 410.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 411.
24. See id. at 410-11.
25. Id. at 411.
26. Id.
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2. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White
Seven years after Ammons, another confrontation between a rail-
road's eminent domain power and a city's zoning authority found its
way into the Texas appellate courts.27 In early 1954, the Gulf, Colo-
rado & Santa Fe Railway Company began extending a switch track
inside the Dallas municipal limits. The city's building inspector
stopped construction because the railroad had not obtained the neces-
sary permit. The city then denied the railroad's subsequent applica-
tion for a permit on the grounds that the switch track was a
commercial use, but the railroad was extending the track into a resi-
dential zone. The railroad appealed this decision to the city's board of
adjustment, which reversed and granted the permit subject to certain
conditions. On petition for certiorari by several nearby property own-
ers, the trial court in turn reversed the board of adjustment, a decision
appealed by both the railroad and the city.
28
As in Ammons, the railroad asserted that its power to condemn
land for purposes of constructing the switch track essentially over-
came any contrary regulations enacted by the city's zoning ordinance.
In addressing that assertion, the court first noted that it made no dif-
ference that the railroad actually had not used eminent domain to ac-
quire the land in question: "Where a company is invested with the
power of eminent domain and secures property to be devoted to a
public use, it is immaterial that title was acquired by a valid purchase
or settlement; the rights acquired are protected to the same extent as
though the property had been condemned."2 9 The court then dis-
cussed Ammons, concluding that there was no principled distinction
between the two cases. Inasmuch as the additional facilities in each
case were "necessarily incident to [the] right to operate a railroad,"
and absent any abuse, the railroads' powers of eminent domain au-
thorized them to place the needed facilities where they deemed best
for the public services they provided.3"
3. Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company
For almost two decades after White, the Texas courts remained si-
lent on the issue of whether a public utility possessing the power of
condemnation must comply with local zoning. In 1972, however, the
question again was raised in the case of Porter v. Southwestern Public
Service Company.31 In that case, after receiving a building permit
from the City of Amarillo, the utility company purchased a parcel of
27. See Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. White, 281 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. See id. at 442.
29. Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See id. at 450.
31. Porter v. Sw. Pub. Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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land zoned for residential use and commenced construction on an
electrical substation. After the substation was 95% completed, how-
ever, the city indicated that the building permit had been issued erro-
neously. Therefore, the utility would have to apply for a special use
permit to continue construction within the residential zone. The city
subsequently denied that application on a tied vote of the commission
and ordered that the substation be removed. A few months later, the
city reversed course, indicating that its attorney now advised that the
utility was not subject to the zoning ordinance, and on this advice, the
utility completed construction. Thereafter, residents of the affected
zone sued the utility company to obtain a permanent injunction forc-
ing removal of the substation due to lack of compliance with the zon-
ing regulations. The trial court dismissed the action, and the residents
appealed.32
As in Ammons and White, the question facing the court concerned
the proper interplay between the utility's condemnation power and
the city's zoning authority. Addressing that question, the court began
in the same place as did Ammons-with a comparison of the two pow-
ers in conflict. Like Ammons, the court noted that both powers were
inherent in the state government and could be delegated for appropri-
ate purposes.33 But the court disagreed that either Ammons or White
controlled the question in the present case. Important to the court's
decision was the fact that, in both of those prior cases, the railroads
had owned the land over which the line extensions were to be made
"long before the building and zoning regulations were enacted. '34 In
the present case, by contrast, the court explained that "the building
and zoning regulations were enacted, and [the utility] was charged
with notice thereof, before [it] purchased the land in the residential
zoned area. ' 35 This distinction mattered, suggested the court, because
although "the power [of eminent domain] normally carries with it the
right to select the location and extent of the property to be taken,"
that right generally is not expressed in the statute granting the utility's
condemnation power.36 Rather, the right is merely implicit so long as
it is not abused,37 and the court indicated that the local government,
via its zoning authority, was the proper entity to judge the question of
abuse. In sum, "[t]he city, to which the state has specifically entrusted
the police powers, has the power to inquire into the reasonableness of
the manner by which eminent domain is to be exercised within its cor-
32. See id. at 362-63.
33. Id. at 363.
34. Id. at 364.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
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porate limits."38 Otherwise, "there could only be [the utility] itself to
determine such standards.
39
B. Must Local Governments Comply With Local Zoning?
As the foregoing discussion shows, the Texas appellate courts have
offered seemingly mixed answers to the question of whether a public
utility must comply with local zoning regulations. Moreover, the
Texas Supreme Court has not provided any direct guidance on the
matter. Nonetheless, the state high court has issued at least two deci-
sions that bear on the question indirectly by discussing whether zoning
governs the exercise of eminent domain by a local government itself.
1. Austin Independent School District v. City of Sunset Valley
The year after Porter, the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether
a local school district had to comply with the zoning regulations of one
of the municipalities served by that district.4" The dispute arose when
the Austin Independent School District proposed to construct athletic
and transportation facilities within the municipal limits of the City of
Sunset Valley. Although the city was served by the school district,
only a single elementary school was located within the city limits.
Moreover, the city's zoning plan required the remainder of the city to
be residential, effectively prohibiting any other school facilities from
being located therein. When the school district asked the city either
to relax its zoning restrictions or to de-annex the site for the new facil-
ities, the city refused and threatened sanctions if the school district
proceeded with the proposed construction.41 In light of these threats,
the school district sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, which the
trial court granted. The court of civil appeals reversed that judgment,
and the school district sought relief from the Texas Supreme Court.42
Before resolving the issue confronting it, the court prefaced its dis-
cussion with two points of significance. First, the court noted that the
trial court specifically found that the school district acted reasonably
in selecting the site for the new facilities, and this finding was not be-
ing challenged on appeal.43 Second, and equally important, the court
observed that the city had made no assertion that the proposed facili-
ties constituted a nuisance.' Therefore, with these issues off the ta-
ble, the court focused its attention on the central question of whether
38. Id. at 365.
39. Id.
40. See Austin Ind. Sch. Dist. v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973).
41. See id. at 671.
42. See id. at 672.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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"the City may utilize its zoning powers to wholly exclude from within
its boundaries school facilities reasonably located. 4 5
Reviewing decisions from other states, as well as its own precedent,
the court answered that question negatively. Citing cases from Mis-
souri and Pennsylvania, the court conceded that other jurisdictions
had subjected local school districts to certain municipal regulations.
The Missouri court, for example, had "correctly held" that a school
district must pay fees assessed by a city for conducting mandatory
safety inspections.46 Similarly, the Pennsylvania court had properly
upheld parking requirements designed to protect "safety, health and
general welfare."47 Moreover, the Texas court itself had previously
indicated that a school district must comply with municipal building
regulations.48 But the court pointed out that none of these cases con-
cerned the location of school facilities; rather, they all dealt with com-
pliance of health and safety requirements.4 9
When one considered the question of site selection, the court sug-
gested, the cases painted a much different picture. Again, the court
found Missouri law to be instructive. Although the Missouri court
had previously subjected a school district to local health and safety
regulations, it distinguished zoning regulations that interfered with a
school district's selection of school sites.50 Noting that at least one
other jurisdiction explicitly made the same distinction,51 the court inti-
mated that Texas, also, had done so implicitly. The Texas Education
Code, for example, like those of other states, gave school districts the
power to acquire and hold real property, including acquisition via emi-
nent domain, for the purpose of constructing school buildings or for
any other purpose deemed necessary by the district.52 The court ex-
plained that, to properly construe these statutes, "one must read into
[them] the power to 'select' sites for school buildings."53 For that rea-
son, the city could not prohibit the school district from locating its
facilities in a residential zone.
Having answered the question put to it, the court in conclusion of-
fered some useful dicta concerning the questions not at issue-i.e.,
whether the school district had acted reasonably or imposed a nui-
45. Id.
46. Id. at 674 (citing Kan. City Sch. Dist. v. Kan. City, 201 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. 1947)).
47. Id. at 672-73 (citing Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 207 A.2d
864 (Pa. 1965)).
48. Id. at 673 (citing Port Arthur Ind. Sch. Dist. v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.2d 330
(Tex. 1964)).
49. See id.; see also id. at 674.
50. See id. at 674 (citing State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss, 304
S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1957)).
51. See id. at 674 n.1 (citing City of Bloomfield v. Davis County Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
119 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1963), Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. City of Cedar Rapids,
106 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 1960)).
52. See id. at 673.
53. Id.
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sance. "The determination flowing from the foregoing," the court
said, "is not that the School District can act with impunity."54 Once
again, the court found decisions from other jurisdictions useful to its
reasoning. Citing precedent from New Jersey and Delaware, the court
stated that "immunity from city zoning laws is tempered by an inquiry
into the reasonableness of the school authorities' actions."55 Accord-
ingly, the court strongly suggested that where the city could show that
the school district exercised its authority unreasonably or arbitrarily,
the result might well be different.56
2. City of Lubbock v. Austin
The Texas Supreme Court had occasion to revisit these issues a dec-
ade later in City of Lubbock v. Austin.57 In that case, the City of Lub-
bock initiated a condemnation proceeding for portions of a residential
lot in connection with improvements planned for a nearby intersec-
tion. The lot owners argued that the proposed condemnation was an
unreasonable use of the city's eminent domain power because con-
summation of the project would render their lot out of compliance
with the local zoning regulations. Specifically, the zoning ordinance
required their lot to have a minimum 10-foot side yard, but after the
condemnation, the side yard would only be a little over four feet. The
jury issued special findings that the city had indeed abused its discre-
tion, but the trial court disregarded these findings and held that the
condemnation could go forward. The Amarillo Court of Civil Ap-
peals reversed, and relief was sought from the Texas Supreme Court.58
The Texas Supreme Court framed the question as "whether a city is
bound by its zoning ordinances when exercising its eminent domain
power. ' 59 To answer that question, the court immediately turned to
its prior decision in Sunset Valley. Noting that the court in that case
had upheld the school district's decision about site selection despite
the resulting violation of the city's zoning plan, the court here saw "no
reason for a different rule when a city is seeking to avoid its own zon-
ing ordinance. ' 60 Moreover, given the challenge being made by the
lot owners, the court also endorsed Sunset Valley's language about
how a condemnor's site selection might be overcome. In short, the
court announced as a rule what Sunset Valley had suggested in dicta:
54. Id. at 674.
55. Id. (citing City of Newark v. Univ. of Del., 304 A.2d 347 (Del. Ch. 1973);
Rutgers, State Univ. v. Piluso, 286 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1971); Wash. Twp. v. Ridgewood
Vill., 141 A.2d 308 (N.J. 1958)).
56. See id. Two justices concurred in the result, but would have placed the burden
on the school district to prove the reasonableness of its claim to zoning immunity. See
id. at 676 (Pope, J., concurring).
57. City of Lubbock v. Austin, 628 S.W.2d 49, 49 (Tex. 1982).
58. See id. 49-50.
59. Id. at 50.
60. Id.
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"[A] city exercising its eminent domain power is not bound by its own
zoning ordinance unless the objecting party can show that the con-
demnation is unreasonable or arbitrary."' 61 And the jury's determina-
tion about that issue was irrelevant in the present context, because the
city's use of eminent domain in a manner conflicting with its own zon-
ing scheme was tantamount to an amendment of that scheme. In such
cases, the court noted, the reasonableness of the amendment was a
question of law to be decided by the court.62 Because the lot owners
had not demonstrated that the city's actions were unreasonable or ar-
bitrary as a matter of law, the condemnation was valid notwithstand-
ing its effect on the zoning compliance of the lot in question.63
II. TEXAS MIDSTREAM-ROADMAP FOR RESOLUTION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates some potential ambiguity in
Texas law on the issue of whether a public utility possessing eminent
domain powers must comply with a municipal zoning plan. Reflecting
some of the differences among the state courts nationwide, Texas deci-
sional authority can be cited in support of both an affirmative and
negative answer. And, as mentioned at the outset of this article, this
lack of clarity has become especially significant as gas drilling opera-
tions in the Barnett Shale encounter resistance from city governments
and their constituents.64 A recent federal court decision arising out of
these operations, however, sheds light on the perceived ambiguities.
Indeed, the federal court's reading of Texas law, while confirming
some tension in the cases, suggests that a way of reconciliation none-
theless remains possible. Perhaps more significant, and as argued
more fully below in Part III, this reading helps to provide an answer to
the larger question concerning the proper interaction between munici-
pal zoning and a utility's power of eminent domain.
The lawsuit resulting in the federal court's decision was filed by
Texas Midstream Gas Services, LLC (Midstream), a natural gas pipe-
line company, to challenge a portion of the City of Grand Prairie's
Unified Development Code. Midstream had previously acquired land
inside the municipal limits of Grand Prairie on which it planned to
construct a compressor station. After being notified of this plan, in
July 2008, the city amended its Unified Development Code specifi-
cally to address the matter of compressor stations like that planned by
Midstream.65 In particular, the amended code subjected compressor
stations to the following requirements: (1) a special use permit for
stations located in certain zoning districts; (2) minimum setback and
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
65. See Tex. Midstream Gas Servs., L.L.C. v. City of Grand Prairie, No. 3:08-CV-
1724-D, 2008 WL 5000038, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2008).
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yard requirements; (3) enclosure of the parcel by a security fence; (4)
enclosure of the station equipment within a structure meeting certain
specifications; (5) the restriction of noises to certain defined levels;
and (6) certain landscaping specifications.66 Midstream, whose parcel
was located within a zone requiring a special use permit, sued to en-
join (both preliminarily and permanently) the enforcement of the July
2008 amendment.67
Included among the arguments advanced by Midstream in support
of its preliminary injunction was that the amendment improperly in-
terfered with its power of eminent domain under Texas law.68 The
city responded that Midstream's eminent domain power was irrele-
vant to the suit because it did not acquire the land in question through
the exercise of that power, nor was it threatening to condemn any
other parcels. Citing White, however, the court rejected the city's po-
sition on the ground that, "[u]nder Texas law, an entity with eminent
domain power has the right not only to appropriate another's prop-
erty but also to use its own property for a public purpose, even if it did
not acquire the property through condemnation."69 Thus, the issue
was not the relevance or not of Midstream's condemnation power;
that power clearly was relevant. The real issue, as framed by the
court, was whether that power gave Midstream the right to build the
compressor station without adhering to the July 2008 amendment.70
Answering that question required the court to review the five Texas
decisions discussed in Part I of this article. According to the court, the
decisions revealed an important dichotomy. The court noted that Am-
mons, White, Sunset Valley, and Austin all concerned ordinances that
interfered with the would-be condemnor's decision about where to lo-
cate its facilities.71 In this regard, Porter had to be viewed as some-
thing of an aberration, since it "subjected a utility with eminent
domain power to a zoning ordinance that prohibited its intended pub-
lic use in the desired location. '72 Even so, the court intimated, Porter
was on to something when it suggested that a utility's eminent domain
power is not in all respects superior to the zoning authority of a local
government. This same point appeared in Ammons, the earliest of the
Texas cases, which allowed the railroad to locate its track irrespective
of the zones established by the city, but nonetheless subjected the con-
struction of that track to the city's building regulations. 73 The court
66. See GRAND PRAIRIE, TEX., UNIFIED DEV. CODE art. 4, § 10 (2008), available
at http://www.gptx.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=397.
67. See Texas Midstream, 2008 WL 5000038, at *1.
68. Midstream also advanced arguments based on federal and state preemption, as
well as a challenge based on violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. See id.
69. Id. at *14.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *16.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *15.
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also pointed out that Sunset Valley "explicitly distinguished between
regulation of site selection and construction, limiting its holding to the
former."74 Thus, the court saw a dominant theme running through the
Texas cases: "While entities with eminent domain power have the
right to select the location for their intended public use - even if such
use is not permitted in the zoning district - they may still be subjected
to other applicable zoning regulations."75 Specifically, "zoning regula-
tions that do not prohibit - i.e., 'zone out' - the intended public use
are not necessarily superseded by the eminent domain power. "76
Applying that standard to the July 2008 amendment yielded a con-
clusion that Midstream had not demonstrated the requisite likelihood
of success to garner a preliminary injunction. According to the court,
the amendment neither "zoned out" compressor stations altogether
nor prohibited Midstream from building its proposed compressor sta-
tion on the land it had selected. To the contrary, the court viewed the
amendment as regulating nothing more than "the aesthetics and noise
level of compressor stations. '7 7 So viewed, the amendment fit within
the distinction made by the Texas cases and looked analogous to the
building regulations to which the railroad was subjected in Ammons.78
Moreover, the court noted Porter's concern about allowing utilities to
operate without any local oversight: "[I]f the City cannot regulate the
aesthetics and noise level of compressor stations within its boundaries,
these will be entirely within [Midstream's] discretion, which may be
detrimental to the surrounding community. 79
III. TEXAS's ANSWER-UNDERSTANDING THE BALANCE
The federal court's reading of Texas case law reveals a constructive
balance between the interests of the utility company and those of the
local government. In short, this balance places the decision about
where to locate utility infrastructure squarely within the utility com-
pany's discretion, so long as that discretion is not abused. Offsetting
the utility's discretion about site selection, however, is the local gov-
ernment's authority to subject the utility company to its reasonable
oversight concerning issues of health, safety, aesthetics, and similar
community interests. The following discussion seeks to flesh out the
reasons underlying this approach, as well as what remedies might be
available in the event that either the utility company or the local gov-
ernment abuses its authority. Additionally, I offer some brief
thoughts about why this approach might ultimately produce better re-
sults than an all-or-nothing system where either the utility can ignore
74. Id. at *16.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *17.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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local regulations, or alternatively must comply with them, in their
entirety.80
A. Utility's Discretion Over Facility Siting
1. Explaining the Need for Utility Discretion
As indicated by the federal court in Texas Midstream, a utility com-
pany possessing the power of eminent domain has extensive discretion
under Texas law with regard to the location of its facilities.8 " The deci-
sion in Ammons made this point explicitly, 2 as have other decisions
from the Texas courts,83 and decisions from several other jurisdictions
are in accord.84 This discretion flows, in large part, from the nature of
the eminent domain power itself. As explained in Ammons,
"[e]minent domain is one of the inalienable rights of sovereignty""5
and exists primarily for the promotion of the general welfare. Simply
put, eminent domain enables the state to take private property, upon
payment of just compensation, when that property is needed by the
public at large to serve the greater good. 6 Perhaps the leading reason
for allowing the state this ability to force an exchange of property is
also suggested by Ammons-to thwart the efforts of private landown-
ers to delay necessary public projects.8 7 This rationale suggests that
the state not only needs the power to take private property for public
use but also needs discretion over the extent and location of the prop-
80. Compare Darlage v. E. Bartholomew Water Corp., 379 N.E.2d 1018, 1019-21
(Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that public utility company is exempt from all local
regulations, including those relating to construction as well as to location), with Ala.
Power Co. v. Brewton Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 339 So. 2d 1025, 1026-27 (Ala.
1976) (affirming denial of variance from local zoning regulations despite evidence that
additional utility facilities were required and that proposed location was most
desirable).
81. To the extent that Porter suggests otherwise, it is out of step with the weight of
Texas authority and the reasoning that follows. See Porter v. Sw. Pub. Serv. Co., 489
S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Our courts have held that in exercising the
right of eminent domain the state delegates to the railway the discretion of selecting
the sites upon which the road shall be located.").
83. See, e.g., Valero Eastex Pipeline Co. v. Jarvis, 926 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1996, writ denied); Lohmann v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 434
S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tex. Elec. Serv.
Co. v. Linebery, 327 S.W.2d 657, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ dism'd);
Cane Belt Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 565,565-66, 72 S.W. 1020, 1020 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1903, no writ).
84. See, e.g., Ala Elec. Co-op. v. Watson, 419 So. 2d 1351, 1356 (Ala. 1982); Gray
v. Ouachita Creek Watershed Dist., 351 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Ark. 1961); La. Res. Co. v.
Stream, 351 So. 2d 517, 518-19 (La. Ct. App. 1977); N. States Power Co. v. Effertz, 94
N.W.2d 288, 291 (N.D. 1959); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Proffitt, 903 S.W.2d 309, 311
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 118 P.3d
996, 1015 (Wyo. 2005).
85. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d at 409.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 410.
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erty to be taken. Indeed, eminent domain may be most necessary
where a particular parcel or location is itself crucial to the project be-
cause, in such circumstances, the fulfillment of the public good may be
held hostage by a single, recalcitrant landowner. In economic terms,
such an owner "has monopoly power vis-A-vis the government, and
may hold out for a price far in excess of [his] opportunity cost."88 Em-
inent domain, therefore, keeps the landowner from thwarting the pro-
ject, either outright or by seeking an exorbitant price, and allows the
project to go forward without undue delay or burden to the
taxpayers.89
This same rationale applies to public utility companies to whom the
state has delegated its power of eminent domain. Again, Ammons
proves instructive. As the court explained in that case, the state, "as a
representative of the public, has a sovereign interest in railroads, the
same as it does in highways or streets." 9° Railroads, like streets and
highways, are essential means of transportation and commerce used
by the public at large. Similarly situated are other utility services such
as water, electricity, telephone, and natural gas. Each of these ser-
vices is, in the words of the Texas Supreme Court, "affected with a
public interest" 91-that is, they are used by the public at large for the
necessities of modern life.92 Because these types of services are essen-
tial to the general welfare, the law imposes on the providers of such
services a duty to furnish them to all potential customers on a non-
discriminatory basis.93 This duty to serve the public carries with it a
duty to construct and maintain adequate facilities sufficient to provide
such service,94 and the fulfillment of these duties underlies the delega-
tion of eminent domain power to the utility provider.95
88. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 28 (2002).
89. Id. at 29.
90. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d at 411.
91. City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 151 Tex. 100, 104, 246 S.W.2d 622, 624 (1952).
92. Cf Potomac Edison Co. v. Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 512
S.E.2d 576, 583 (W. Va. 1998) (explaining that "electric power is necessary for the
public health, safety and welfare").
93. See City of Lubbock v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 41 S.W.3d 149, 155, 157 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (endorsing definition of "public utility" as "a privately
owned and operated business whose services are so essential to the general public as
to justify the grant of special franchises for the use of public property or of the right of
eminent domain, in consideration of which the owners must serve all persons who
apply, without discrimination" (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1232 (5th ed.
1979))).
94. Cf. Consol. Edison Co. v. Vill. of Briarcliff Manor, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379, 384 (Sup.
Ct. 1955) (stating that public utility company had duty to erect and maintain proposed
facilities because state law mandated that it "furnish and provide such service, instru-
mentalities and facilities as shall be safe and adequate and in all respects just and
reasonable").
95. See McAmis v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 184 S.W. 331, 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1916, writ ref'd) (indicating that delegation of eminent domain power is made
"on the theory that such power [once delegated] will promote the general welfare");
Cane Belt Ry. Co., 31 Tex. Civ. App. at 565, 72 S.W. at 1020 (noting that "the public
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Once delegated, the power to condemn carries with it discretion
over the parcels subject to condemnation for the same reasons articu-
lated above- i.e., to prevent any one landowner (or each landowner
along a proposed utility route) from exercising monopoly power to
obstruct a project necessary to serve the general public. 96 The same
rationale also serves to limit judicial review of the condemnor's discre-
tion, as explained by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in 1903:
If different courts and juries were allowed to pass on the necessity
or advisability of condemning each tract out of the many which go
to make up a right of way for a railway line, straight courses from
point to point, with the consequent lessening of mileage, would in
many, if not all, cases be impossible to secure. So in the case of
depot grounds. One jury might hold, on competent evidence, that
the land in question was not necessary to the purposes of the rail-
road. Another might render a like verdict as to any other tract
sought to be subjected to its uses, and by such a course the company
could be excluded altogether.97
Although this passage directly addresses the context of railroad
condemnations, its logic has equal force in the context of other utility
services. 98 It also helps explain why, in addition to individual land-
owners and courts, local governing authorities also should defer to a
utility's discretion over site selection. Because these authorities are
elected by and serve the interests of local residents, they naturally re-
flect many of the concerns and biases of those residents. Such reflec-
tion can produce both advantages and disadvantages. Inasmuch as the
political units involved are generally small and localized, they have
been viewed as more responsive to the needs of their constituents
than governments at larger levels.9 9 As explained by William A. Fis-
chel's "homevoter hypothesis," local decision-making has greater in-
fluence on home values, resulting in greater participation by
homeowners in local government, which in turn produces more effi-
cient governmental action.100 However, these same features can pro-
duce negative results, as well, especially when it comes to zoning.10 1
The small and insular nature of local governments raises the potential
that local prejudices may go unchecked for lack of a sufficiently strong
have a large interest" in public utilities and common carriers "and for this reason the
power of eminent domain is conferred").
96. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 88, at 30.
97. Hughes, 31 Tex. Civ. App. at 565, 72 S.W. at 1020.
98. See, e.g., Lohmann v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 434 S.W.2d 879, 881
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (applying Hughes rationale to con-
demnations by natural gas pipeline company).
99. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown:
How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 929, 930-31 (2004).
100. See id. at 931 (summarizing "homevoter hypothesis").
101. See id. at 930 ("Zoning serves the interests of a majority of local voters, most
of whom are homeowners, and zoning's excesses must be laid at their doorstep.").
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countervailing interest. In its worst form, these shared values can turn
into a majoritarian tyranny of the sort famously warned against by
James Madison, placing self-interest ahead of the public well-being.10
In the context of public utility services, this means that local govern-
ments can be just as obstructive to the general welfare as any individ-
ual landowner or jury. Although a local government may understand
the need to allow facilities that are directly essential for delivering
services to its own residents, it may become more myopic with regard
to facilities lacking such an obvious local connection. In the words of
one commentator, "left to their own devices, municipalities have often
been incapable of making local land use decisions that are sensitive to
regional and statewide needs." ' 3 Thus, there is a real danger that
facilities designed to generate, store, process, or transport services on
a state or regional basis might run afoul of local prejudices, jeopardiz-
ing a number of interests wider than those represented in the local
political landscape.10 4 As explained by one court: "If each county
were to pronounce its own regulation and control over electric wires,
pipe lines and oil lines, the conveyors of power and fuel could become
so twisted and knotted as to affect adversely the welfare of the entire
state." 105 Vesting the utility company with discretion over siting mini-
mizes these risks. In short, "[w]hile local authorities and neighbors
may not want an electric substation or oil pipeline in a residential
area, the desire for efficient provision of service may compel insulat-
ing the utility from local law."10 6
102. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45-46 (James Madison) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan ed., 1990) ("When a majority is included in a faction, the form of
popular government... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the
public good and the rights of other citizens."); see also id. at 48 ("[T]he smaller the
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression."). Numerous scholars have noted the connections between Madison's ar-
guments in The Federalist No. 10 and local land use regulation. See, e.g., Robert C.
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.
J. 385, 405-07 (1977); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1499 (2008); John M. Payne, Politics, Exclusionary Zoning and
Robert Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 689, 706 (1997); Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable
Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor Cla-
eys, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 231, 241 (2004).
103. Sager A. Williams, Jr., Comment, Limiting Local Zoning Regulation of Elec-
tric Utilities: A Balanced Approach in the Public Interest, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 565, 608
(1994).
104. A related danger might be that, once the local government realizes that the
facilities must be located somewhere, it zones such facilities in areas that are least
likely to have the political capital to put up an effective fight-e.g., those areas popu-
lated predominately by poorer and minority residents. See Vicki Been, What's Fair-
ness Got to Do With It?: Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable
Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1009-15 (1993) (discussing discriminatory sit-
ing of locally undesirable land uses).
105. Chester County v. Phila. Elec. Co., 218 A.2d 331, 332-33 (Pa. 1966).
106. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLAN-
NING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 113-14 (2003).
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At the end of the day, the law views the public utility company as a
sort of agent for the general welfare. 107 This view is implicit in the
Texas cases, and once again, Ammons provides a useful illustration.
The logic of that opinion can be traced as follows: (1) the state has a
sovereign interest in railroads; (2) to promote this interest, the state
delegated its power of eminent domain to the railroad company; and
(3) absent an abuse of that delegated authority, the railroad's decision
to promote the statewide interest necessarily takes precedence over
the municipality's parochial concerns with regard to placement of the
facilities. 108 Similar logic can be found in Sunset Valley, where the
court characterized the city's exercise of its zoning authority as a
wholesale exclusion of school facilities from the municipal limits. 109
Implicit in this characterization is the notion that the city, in dumping
the burden of school facilities off on other communities while none-
theless utilizing the services provided by the school district, was pro-
moting its own self-interest at the expense of the school district as a
whole.'1 0 Applying this logic to the wider context of public utilities
generally, the question ultimately seems to focus on which entity, the
utility or the local government, can be trusted to employ its powers
most in conformity with the general welfare at all levels-local, re-
gional, state, and (perhaps) national. Because the utility's service ob-
ligations most likely expand to a larger area than that of any local
government, it makes sense as a general matter to vest siting discre-
tion with the utility.
2. Challenging Abuses of Utility Discretion
As the Texas cases suggest, however, this discretion is not com-
pletely unfettered. Just as an agent might exceed the authority actu-
ally bestowed by its principal, so, too, might a utility company abuse
its discretion concerning the exercise of eminent domain. The Texas
Supreme Court acknowledged this potential for abuse in both Sunset
Valley and Austin. In the former decision, after holding that the
school district generally was exempt from the city's zoning regulations
regarding the placement of facilities, the court nonetheless opined in
dictum that the school district's discretion could not be exercised un-
107. See Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Turnage, 669 S.E.2d 138, 139 (Ga. 2008) ("Pub-
lic utilities are generally granted a protected status with respect to zoning restrictions
because of the greater public welfare which utilities serve .... ).
108. See Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d 407,410-11 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. See Austin Ind. Sch. Dist. v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex.
1973).
110. Cf Consol. Edison Co. v. Vill. of Briarcliff Manor, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379, 385 (Sup.
Ct. 1955) ("One municipality, especially where it uses particular public utility services,
may not, so to speak, dump the undesirable facilities necessary to furnish such ser-
vices upon the lap of an adjoining municipality.").
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reasonably. 1 ' In Austin, as noted above, the court adopted this dic-
tum as a rule of decision: "[A] city exercising its eminent domain
power is not bound by its own zoning authority unless the objecting
party can show that the condemnation is unreasonable or arbitrary.
'112
Applying this rule to the public utility context suggests that a city (or
its residents) may seek to overcome the utility company's discretion
over site selection in the narrow class of cases where it can show that
the utility abused that discretion.
Other decisions, both from Texas and elsewhere, provide additional
guidance for how the rule normally should apply. As an initial matter,
regardless of whether it actually acquired the parcel in question
through eminent domain or not,' 13 the utility company must establish
that the facilities to be constructed thereon are necessary for advanc-
ing some public use or purpose.1 14 These issues generally are ques-
tions of law for judicial determination, but here, too, some amount of
deference is given to the decision of the condemning body.'1 5 For ex-
ample, great weight is usually afforded legislative declarations that a
particular use is public, and this is true with regard to legislative dele-
gations of the eminent domain power as well.116 As for necessity, a
condemnor normally need only show that its governing board made a
determination that the taking was necessary.11 7 Importantly, there is
no requirement that the board specifically declare the necessity of the
particular tract of land in question.11
Once public use and necessity are established, the burden then
shifts to the party challenging the utility's decision to show that the
company "acted in bad faith, or has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
fraudulently, in selecting the particular land for its purpose."1 19
Where a question of fact exists as to these issues, they may be submit-
ted to a jury for resolution.' 20 Mounting a successful challenge to the
utility's site selection, however, presents a high hurdle, as demon-
111. See Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d at 674.
112. City of Lubbock v. Austin, 628 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tex. 1982) (emphasis added).
113. Cf. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. White, 281 S.W.2d 441, 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that it is irrelevant whether the utility actually
exercises its eminent domain power so long as it could do so).
114. See generally Whittington v. City of Austin, 174 S.W.3d 889, 896-98 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied) (discussing public use and necessity requirements);
see also id. at 906 n.15 (mentioning condemnor's "initial burden to establish public use
and necessity").
115. See id. at 897-98.
116. Anderson v. Teco Pipeline Co., 985 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1998, pet. denied).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 566.
119. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co. v. Linebery, 327 S.W.2d 657, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1959, writ dism'd); accord Valero Eastex Pipeline Co. v. Jarvis, 926 S.W.2d 789, 792
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, writ denied); accord Lohmann v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
Am., 434 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
120. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d at 566.
[Vol. 16
2009] UTILITIES, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND LAND USE 47
strated by the judicial statements used to define the characteristics
that must be proved. "Bad faith," for example, has been distinguished
from mere negligence or poor judgment and instead has been equated
with conscious wrongdoing motivated by improper interest, ill will, or
dishonest intent.1 1 "Fraud" has been defined as "any act, omission or
concealment, which involved a breach of legal duty, trust or confi-
dence, justly reposed and is injurious to another, or by which an un-
due and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. ' 12  Finally,
the courts have defined "arbitrary and capricious" to "mean willful
and unreasoning action, action without consideration and in disregard
of the facts and circumstances exist[ing] at the time condemnation was
decided upon, or within the foreseeable future.' ' 123 Thus, to demon-
strate that the utility company acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the
challenger must produce evidence that the decision was "freakish,
whimsical, fickle, changeable, unsteady" or "fixed or done ... at plea-
sure; not founded in the nature of things; non-rational; not done or
acting according to reason or judgment; depending on the will alone;
tyrannical; despotic. '1 24 A mere difference of opinion about the loca-
tion of the facilities will not suffice, 125 nor will evidence that another
location was equally or better suited to the project.126 Rather, the
challenger has to come forward with evidence negating "any reasona-
ble basis for determining what and how much land to condemn.
1 127 If
the challenger is unable to meet this burden, then it must concede the
utility's choice of location irrespective of the parcel's local zoning
designation.' 28
121. City of Atlanta v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 271 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. 1980);
City of Freeman v. Salis, 2001 SD 84, 11, 630 N.W.2d 699, 703 (2001).
122. Wagoner v. City of Arlington, 345 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
123. Id.
124. Webb v. Dameron, 219 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
125. See id. ("Action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and
upon due consideration, where there is room for two opinions, however much it may
be believed that an erroneous conclusion was reached.").
126. See, e.g., Malcolmson Rd. Util. Dist. v. Newsom, 171 S.W.3d 257, 269 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) ("[A] showing that alternate plans are
feasible or better does not make the condemnation determination arbitrary or
capricious.").
127. Id. at 269.
128. See City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1977) (stating that,
once necessity is shown, "the landowner must then either concede the existence of a
necessity or be prepared to show bad faith or abuse of discretion as an affirmative
defense"); see also Newsom, 171 S.W.3d at 268 (explaining that issue of necessity in-
cludes "condemnor's discretion to determine what and how much land to condemn
for its purposes").
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B. Local Government's Authority to Regulate Non-Siting Issues
1. Explaining the Need for Local Oversight
Balanced against the utility's general discretion over siting is the
authority of the local government to regulate non-siting issues that
affect health, safety, aesthetics, and similar community interests.~2 9
Just as the siting discretion afforded the utility flows from the nature
of the eminent domain power, the justification for the local govern-
ment's oversight of non-siting matters starts with the nature and pur-
poses of the zoning power. A city's authority to regulate land use, as
long explained by the Texas courts, exists to promote and safeguard its
residents' interests in public health, morals, safety, comfort, good gov-
ernment, peace, tranquility, order, and the general welfare. 130 Be-
cause the zoning power is administered on the local level, of necessity,
the interests it seeks to encourage and protect are predominately local
in nature. As explained above, local governments generally under-
stand and efficiently respond to matters of concern to their residents,
at least as compared to larger units of government. This normally
holds true with regard to zoning as well as to other municipal func-
tions. While this quality can produce problems with regard to siting
utility infrastructure, it can prove beneficial when applied to other
matters.
Examples of such locally beneficial regulations might include per-
mitting requirements, certain environmental standards, noise and light
abatement, certain structural and building configurations, setback and
yard requirements, landscaping standards, and bonding and insurance
requirements. These types of regulations would normally serve to
minimize any negative externalities imposed by the utility facility on
interests that are uniquely local and not otherwise represented. Per-
mitting, for example, ensures some local oversight so that the utility,
probably an outsider, does not have carte blanche to ignore commu-
nity interests that it may not share or of which it may not be cognizant.
Building regulations, environmental mitigation, landscaping require-
ments, and other similar standards seek to foster substantive protec-
tion for these community interests. Requirements that the utility
company be bonded and have sufficient insurance helps ensure that
the community and its residents have some remedy against injuries
caused by the utility company.
In addition to issues such as physical health and safety, a primary
concern is protecting those intangible attributes of the local area that
may be particularly vulnerable once the utility's siting decision has
129. See, e.g., Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (subjecting railroad to municipal building
regulations).
130. See, e.g., Ellis v. City of W. Univ. Place, 141 Tex. 608, 609, 175 S.W.2d 396, 397
(1943); Ammons, 215 S.W.2d at 409; Klepak v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 177 S.W.2d
215, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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been made. Put differently, a primary aim of local regulation is to
minimize further injury to the "character" of the area in which the
facility is located. As Bradley C. Karkkainen has explained, zoning
not only protects adverse impacts on residential market values but
also protects a homeowner's consumer surplus that goes above and
beyond market calculations.13 1 Stated simply, this consumer surplus
includes subjective qualities that are difficult (if not impossible) to
measure on an objective basis.132 Professor Karkkainen asserts that
these subjective qualities produce not only a surplus value in the prop-
erty owner's particular home or parcel but also in the character of the
surrounding area or neighborhood-what he terms "neighborhood
commons." '133 In addition to amenities such as parks, schools, houses
of worship, and similar area establishments, these commons "include
other intangible qualities such as neighborhood ambiance, aesthetics,
the physical environment (including air quality and noise), and rela-
tive degrees of anonymity or neighborliness."' 34 Together, these qual-
ities make up the "feel" or "character" of the neighborhood, and this
"character" in part motivates a property owner's decision about where
to locate and establish ties.'35 Because different people place differ-
ent values on different neighborhood characteristics, "character" usu-
ally is not sufficiently reflected in the market value of any particular
parcel.'36 Zoning, therefore, "is not merely a system for protecting
the market values of individual properties, but rather is a device to
protect neighborhood residents' interests in their entirety, including
consumer surplus in their homes, as well as their interests in . . . the
neighborhood commons. 137
As with zoning generally, subjecting a utility company to non-siting
regulations seeks to defend from further negative effects the "charac-
ter" of the area in which the facility is sited. By way of example,
building regulations and landscaping requirements can minimize aes-
thetic harm caused by the facility, whereas standards for noise and
light abatement can help preserve the neighborhood's environment
and atmosphere. Without some local oversight, these "character" in-
terests may be disrupted by the utility, leaving neighborhood residents
with the choice of expending their own resources to alleviate the dis-
ruption or moving out of the neighborhood altogether. 138 In either
131. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENvrL. L. 45, 65 (1994).
132. See Frank I. Michelman, Property as Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1097, 1112 (1981) ("[W]e can easily see that property may represent more than
money because it may represent things that money itself can't buy-place, position,
relationship, roots, community, solidarity, status" and "security").
133. Karkkainen, supra note 131, at 68-69.
134. Id. at 69.
135. Id. at 69-70.
136. Id. at 70.
137. Id. at 66-67.
138. Cf. id. at 66.
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case, there is a danger that the utility will impose negative externali-
ties on the neighborhood. Although the externalities are easier to see
where residents are making out-of-pocket expenditures as a result of
the utility's presence, externalities may result where residents exit the
neighborhood as well. If the "character" of the locale includes a
strong sense of community-that is, robust interpersonal relationships
that have developed based on proximity, shared interests, and the pas-
sage of time-then the exit of certain members of the community may
impose social costs on those who remain.139 Whether in the form of
money or lost relationships, to the extent that utility infrastructure im-
poses such externalities, then the community, acting through its
elected officials, should have the ability to regulate in ways that force
the utility company to internalize at least some of these costs.
1 40
In sum, just as local governments do not always account for regional
or state concerns, it is equally true that "utilities ... do not always
make decisions that sufficiently consider and protect vital local inter-
ests. '141 Exempting utilities wholesale from local regulation, there-
fore, may accomplish little more than replacing the local government's
shortsightedness with that of the utility company. As explained by
Porter, some local oversight is desirable so that the utility is not left
free to build infrastructure completely "inconsiderate of the city's pe-
culiar problems of health, safety and welfare.
142
2. Challenging Abuses of Local Oversight
Nonetheless, the local government may not promote local health,
safety, and welfare to the detriment of the wider concerns discussed
above-that is, in a manner that imposes inordinate costs that bear no
real relationship to the utility's effects on the neighborhood so as to
impede the company's ability to meet its service obligations. Accord-
ingly, as with the utility's siting determination, the regulations im-
posed by the local government are subject to judicial review.
Successfully contesting such regulations, however, presents a high bar
similar to that confronting a challenge to the utility's discretion over
siting. As have courts in other states, 43 the Texas courts have made
139. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities
and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 114 (2004) (noting exter-
nalities problem in context of community because "each resident in a community has
a stake in the continued presence of other members and simultaneously bestows a
benefit on others by his own presence").
140. This point seems implicit in the distinction between siting and safety regula-
tions made by the court in Sunset Valley, as well as in the court's mentioning that the
school district facilities at issue in that case were not alleged to impose a nuisance.
See Austin Ind. Sch. Dist. v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex. 1973).
141. Williams, supra note 103, at 609.
142. Porter v. Sw. Pub. Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. See, e.g., Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City & County of Honolulu, 78 P.3d 1, 10
(Haw. 2003); Four States Realty Co. v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 659, 672 (La.
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clear that zoning is a legislative function entitled to a presumption of
validity.144 As such, the party seeking to prevent enforcement of a
zoning ordinance bears the "extraordinary burden" 14 5 of showing that
it is arbitrary or unreasonable because it lacks a substantial relation-
ship to public health, safety, welfare, or morals.146 Ultimately, the
reasonableness of the local government's regulations is a question of
law for determination by the court, although disputes about the facts
on which that determination depends are to be handled like any other
factual dispute, including resolution by jury where appropriate. 47 To
succeed, the challenger must demonstrate "a clear abuse of municipal
discretion" or come forward with "conclusive evidence that a zoning
ordinance is arbitrary either generally or as to particular property.
1 48
If reasonable minds can differ on these questions, then the regulations
must be upheld. 149
Applying these standards to a local government's non-siting regula-
tions of utility infrastructure yields the conclusion that most of these
regulations should be upheld against legal challenge. However, in de-
termining whether local regulations are reasonable, courts must be
mindful of the reasons that the utility is vested with discretion over
site selection. Of particular concern is ensuring that the local govern-
ment does not utilize its authority to regulate non-siting issues as a
mere pretext for undoing the utility's siting discretion, bestowed in the
first instance due to the danger of parochial concerns at the local level
that might place larger interests in jeopardy. Inasmuch as zoning ex-
ists to promote the general welfare, local regulations (even over non-
siting issues) that "stand in the way of necessary public utility develop-
ment" are invalid as "contrary to rather than in the interest of general
welfare."' 5 ° Thus, local regulations that unduly hinder the ability to
1975); Childs v. Hancock County Bd. of Supervisors, 2006-CT-00608-SCT (T 12), 1 So.
3d 855, 859 (Miss. 2009); Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, 26, 751 N.W.2d 780,
790 (2008); cf. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 106, at 170 ("Most states
treat all zoning changes, whether general or site-specific, as legislative acts and accord
them a presumption of validity.").
144. See, e.g., City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173, 175-76 (Tex. 1981); City of
San Antonio v. Arden Encino Partners, 103 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2003, no pet.).
145. Arden, 103 S.W.3d at 630.
146. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d at 176.
147. Arden, 103 S.W.3d at 630; accord Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. City of Dallas, 98
Tex. 396, 417-18, 84 S.W. 648, 654-55 (1905).
148. Arden, 103 S.W.3d at 630 (quoting City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d
773, 779 (Tex. 1972)).
149. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d at 176.
150. Consol. Edison Co. v. Vill. of Briarcliff Manor, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379, 384 (Sup. Ct.
1955); see also Houston, 98 Tex. at 415, 84 S.W. at 653 (explaining that power to
regulate land use is "commensurate with, but does not exceed, the duty to provide for
the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as con-
sistently as may be with private property rights" and "a privation by force of the
police power fulfills this requirement only when the power is exercised for the pur-
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satisfy the utility's duty to serve are unreasonable and qualify as an
abuse of the government's zoning authority.15 1
C. Increased Bargaining as One Benefit of the Balance
Having explained the justifications for and limits of the authority
that Texas law gives to the utility company and the local government,
it remains to discuss why this approach provides a desirable model for
other jurisdictions. Although an exhaustive discussion on this point is
beyond the scope of this article, I will offer one likely benefit of this
balanced approach beyond what has already been said. Ideally, the
balanced approach described here should provide incentive for in-
creased negotiation between the local community and the utility com-
pany over the placement and construction of utility infrastructure.
This benefit may best be considered by comparing it to the alterna-
tive systems. Where the utility company must comply with all local
regulations, both siting-related and otherwise, one wonders how
strong a motivation there is on the part of the community or its repre-
sentatives to seriously engage the utility's concerns and commitments.
Likewise, in a system where the utility company is completely ex-
empted from local regulations, there might be little reason (apart from
public relations, perhaps) for the utility to demonstrate genuine inter-
est in purely local matters, especially those as subjective as concerns
about neighborhood "character." Under the balanced approach, how-
ever, both the utility and the community have power and, concomi-
tantly, each have something to gain and something to lose. While the
utility more or less has the ability to locate its facilities where it legiti-
mately deems best, it nonetheless will have to comply with whatever
reasonable non-siting regulations the local government thinks neces-
sary. Under this approach, the community knows from the outset that
it will not be able to prevent the facility's construction in the area
chosen by the utility, and the utility realizes that it will be subjected to
local oversight concerning how that construction proceeds. Moreover,
although both sides will be kept in check by the courts, each knows
that it will be possible to undo the decisions made by the other only in
the most egregious of circumstances. Accordingly, it would seem to
be in everyone's best interest for the utility representatives, the local
officials, and the community leaders to come to some sort of mutually
amicable arrangement before a siting decision has been finalized and
regulatory enforcement has been commenced.
pose of accomplishing, and in a manner appropriate to the accomplishment of, the
purposes for which it exists").
151. See Potomac Edison Co. v. Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 512
S.E.2d 576, 583 (W. Va. 1998) ("Local governments may, in the public interest, pro-
vide reasonable parameters for land use; but local governments cannot effectively
prohibit a utility from conducting its necessary activities, and thereby 'dump' the con-
struction of utility facilities on other jurisdictions.").
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At least two objections may be raised to theassertion that increased
bargaining between the utility and the community actually qualifies as
a resulting benefit of the balanced approach. First, it might be argued
that any bargains that emerge from such an approach would constitute
illegal contract zoning and, therefore, would be unenforceable. Sec-
ond, as with any bargaining process, there is a risk that the resulting
arrangements could lead to abuse or inequities because of power im-
balances, inefficient information, or outright corruption. While these
objections raise important issues, the dangers they predict seem to be
overstated in the context under consideration.
As an initial matter, what exactly amounts to illegal contract zoning
is a question lacking a clear answer.15 Indeed, the term "contract
zoning" itself seems to suggest more about a court's normative conclu-
sions regarding the validity of a particular bargain than it does about
the fact that bargaining may have occurred. 53 Many decisions seem
to employ the label "contract zoning" to describe bargaining arrange-
ments perceived as illicit, whereas those arrangements recognized as
legitimate are termed "conditional zoning," without much explanation
of any analytical differences between the two categories. 154 Other de-
cisions attempt to distinguish permissible and impermissible bargains
by focusing on whether the bargain involves only a unilateral promise
from the landowner or a bilateral agreement involving reciprocal
promises between both the landowner and the government. 5 5 But
determining exactly what constitutes a unilateral or bilateral arrange-
ment is difficult because "even unilateral agreements can serve as an
incentive to government action."'1 56 Thus, whatever labels are at-
152. According to the Texas Supreme Court, "'[c]ontract zoning' occurs when a
governmental entity, such as a city, enters into a binding contract in which it promises
to zone land in a certain way in exchange for a landowner's promise to use the land in
a particular manner." City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770,
772 n.2 (Tex. 2006). This definition is by no means uniform among courts that have
considered the question. See Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 366
n.17 (Mass. 2003) (discussing differing definitions of "contract zoning"). It should be
noted that the Texas Supreme Court has not yet addressed the legal validity of con-
tract zoning. See Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 772 n.2.
153. See Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zon-
ing, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land
Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 979-80 (1987) (examining cases and concluding that
labels used by courts often are "adopted for purposes of describing the ultimate dis-
position of the case" rather than "for purposes of defining the applicable theoretical
framework").
154. See id. (noting that "contract zoning" often operates as "a convenient epithet"
while courts "deliberately cho[o]se the 'conditional zoning' terminology ...as a
means of describing rezoning arrangements perceived as legitimate"). For an exam-
ple of a court recognizing this tendency, but falling into the same trap itself, see Cross
v. Hall County, 235 S.E.2d 379, 382-83 (Ga. 1977).
155. See, e.g., Chrismon v. Guilford County, 370 S.E.2d 579, 594 (N.C. 1988).
156. Wegner, supra note 153, at 979 n.122; see also Cross, 235 S.E.2d at 382 (up-
holding unilateral promise by developer even though it seemingly provided substan-
tial motivation for county's ultimate zoning decision).
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tached to any particular bargaining process, it seems that the mere
existence of bargaining, without more, is rarely sufficient to undo a
zoning determination. 1
57
What more is needed to push a negotiated result into the category
of illegality is not entirely clear, although several opinions suggest that
the determining factors are the same as with any other zoning ques-
tion-i.e., the openness of the process and the reasonableness of the
final decision. 158 Under this standard, any negotiations between the
utility company, local government officials, and community leaders
would be valid so long as: (1) no commitments are made before a fair
and open hearing held in accordance with applicable law; (2) all par-
ties have an opportunity to voice their concerns and interests in such a
hearing; and (3) the substance of any final decision concerning the
placement and construction of utility infrastructure substantially pro-
motes the public interest and general welfare.
Moreover, the satisfaction of these requirements should go a long
way in minimizing any concerns about power imbalances, lack of in-
formation, or corruption. As explained above, the balanced approach
gives significant power both to the utility company (over siting issues)
and to the local government (over non-siting issues). Increased partic-
ipation by citizens on the local level provides a political incentive for
the elected officials, especially those representing the affected area or
neighborhood, to assure that the community's interests are adequately
promoted.' 59 And it is assumed that community leaders-e.g., repre-
sentatives of homeowners associations, the chamber of commerce,
and other community interest groups-will be involved in the pre-
hearing discussions alongside the utility and local officials. Finally, the
bargaining process itself, coupled with an open public hearing and the
prospect of judicial review, should open channels for the transfer of
information 6 ° and decrease opportunities for graft and other abuses.
157. See McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2002) ("The existence of an agreement per se does not invalidate related
zoning actions .. "); cf PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & TIMoTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND
USE REGULATION 193 (2003) ("If anything is apparent . . . in day-to-day land use
practice before zoning officials, it is that modern zoning, in the general sense, is a
negotiation, not simply an application and response.").
158. See, e.g., Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 369 (Mass. 2003)
(indicating that "proper focus" of review "is whether [the bargained-for decision] vio-
lates State law or constitutional provisions, is arbitrary or unreasonable, or is substan-
tially unrelated to the public health, safety, or general welfare"); Old Canton Hills
Homeowners Ass'n v. Mayor of City of Jackson, 1998-CA-01514-SCT (1 12), 749 So.
2d 54, 59 (Miss. 1999) (upholding decision where "all parties were given opportunity
to speak" and council made determination based on "genuine belief that the rezoning
was in the best interests of the City"); Dacy v. Vill. of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 797-98
(N.M. 1992) (bargaining valid where "the municipality does not commit itself to any
specified action before the zoning hearing" and "does not circumvent statutory proce-
dures or compromise the rights of affected persons").
159. See Karkkainen, supra note 131, at 84.
160. See id.
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In sum, the balanced approach, whereby the utility company is
vested with discretion over siting and the local government is vested
with authority to regulate non-siting matters, provides incentives for
the interested parties to work out mutually beneficial arrangements
regarding the location and construction of utility infrastructure.
Moreover, where such arrangements are negotiated on an inclusive
basis, subject to open and fair procedures, and represent acceptable
standards both for the utility's service obligations and the commu-
nity's concerns, they should not run afoul of the aforementioned ob-
jections. To be sure, by empowering both the utility and the
community, this approach reduces legal certainty. But that very fea-
ture encourages both sides to look for common ground, with the
tradeoff hopefully being greater flexibility, healthier discourse, en-
hanced efficiency, and improved decision-making. 161
CONCLUSION
Despite the tension that exists among some of the Texas decisions
on the issue, a close evaluation of the case law reveals that Texas fol-
lows a balanced approach when considering the proper interaction be-
tween a utility's power of eminent domain and a local government's
zoning authority. On one side, the utility provider is vested with dis-
cretion over the location of utility infrastructure to ensure its ability to
meet its service obligations, which might be hindered by purely local
concerns that do not adequately consider interests at larger levels. On
the other side, the local government is vested with authority to subject
the utility to reasonable non-siting regulations to force internalization
of some of the costs the facilities may impose on local interests, espe-
cially the "character" of the neighborhood in which the facilities are
located. This balance thus recognizes the multiple interests involved
in the placement and construction of utility infrastructure and divides
power so as to better ensure that those interests receive proper con-
sideration and protection.
One likely advantage of this balanced approach is increased negoti-
ation between the utility company, local officials, and community
leaders, resulting in mutually beneficial arrangements over the siting
and building of utility facilities. By empowering both the utility and
the local government, this approach provides an incentive for each to
bargain with the other. And where such bargaining includes all
161. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Planning and the Law, 20 VT. L. REv. 657, 660-61
(1996) ("A healthy political process contemplates and encourages negotiation in deci-
sion-making that makes outcomes uncertain .... Political bargains change over time,
but the essential prerequisite to healthy bargaining is the presence of interest groups
that have comparable weight in the process that produces these bargains."); Wegner,
supra note 153, at 960 ("[Tlhe bargaining process may be more efficient because it
facilitates cost-efficient outcomes and substitutes a potentially cheaper decisionmak-
ing process that fosters prompt and amicable compromises while avoiding the costs
attendant to protracted administrative and judicial appeals.").
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voices, a fair and open process, and produces decisions that advance
both the utility's service obligations and the concerns of the commu-
nity, these negotiations should produce more informed and effective
decisions over where and how utility infrastructure is built.
